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Introduction
Upon winning the general election in February 2011, Taoiseach elect
Enda Kenny spoke of a ‘democratic revolution’. Within weeks, a
programme for government was agreed between Fine Gael and
Labour, promising to ‘radically reform an out-dated system of
administration’ and determining to ‘change’ and ‘renew’ the political
system. Much was made of the new government’s political and
administrative reform plans. But how many of these reform plans were
delivered? How effective were these plans in bringing about change
and renewal to a political and administrative system found seriously
wanting as the financial crash unfolded? And as Ireland emerges from
recession, has anything really changed? These are the questions that
guide this collection of articles. 
This special issue brings together contributions from some of the
most eminent scholars of Irish politics to assess the extent to which the
promises of political and administrative reform were delivered in the
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years after 2011. In the next section, we provide an overview of the
political reform debate that emerged prior to the 2011 election. We
document the core features of the debate and highlight the main
contributors. Following this, we provide an overview of each of the
articles, drawing out their main themes and conclusions. In the final
section, we review the political reform process in Ireland before
concluding with an assessment of the ‘democratic revolution’. 
Diagnosis: Political failure
An old democracy, Ireland was one of the first countries in Europe to
enter into a financial bailout. The global banking crisis from 2008
exposed grave weaknesses in the banking system. A boom in the
construction sector from the early 2000s had rapidly grown into a
bubble and its eventual collapse overwhelmed Irish banks and
eventually the public finances in late 2010. The impact of the
combined property and banking crashes spread rapidly through the
real economy and unemployment increased sharply. A decision by the
government to guarantee the debts of Irish banks as a means of
managing the banking crisis was particularly controversial. It brought
much of the financial burden for the crash onto the state balance
sheet, ultimately making it impossible for the state to secure funding
on international markets and resulting in the state entering into a
programme of financial assistance. The package of financial
assistance, known as the bailout, was provided by the European
Central Bank, European Commission and the International Monetary
Fund. The trio of organisations came to be known as the troika and
mandated significant reforms of the Irish administrative system as part
of the memorandum of understanding which underpinned the bailout. 
The scale of the economic failure resulted in widespread and
penetrating critiques of the political and administrative system. Poor
economic management, both in the lead up to and during the crisis,
resulted in searing criticism of the then Fianna Fáil/Green Party
coalition government, but the evaluation quickly broadened to
encompass the wider political and administrative system. Ireland had
experienced a prolonged recession during the 1980s, and when it
entered a second deep economic crisis within a generation, questions
were asked about the nature of policymaking. A crisis of politics
increasingly came to grip political elites in the face of the financial
meltdown and a growing realisation that past electoral certainties no
longer applied. 
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A broad debate on political and administrative reform emerged and
was especially prominent in the lead up to the 2011 general election.
All of the political parties produced political reform proposals, which
were included in their manifestos, and some developed stand-alone
policy documents, such was the interest in the debate. Political reform
was included in the lists of most important issues at the election by
polling companies and the political parties were joined in the debate
by civil society groups, business leaders and academics. The debate
was widespread and discussions about electoral reform and the proper
functioning of parliament featured across campaign debates and the
opinion pages of the national newspapers.
The diagnoses of political failure were manifold and emphasis
varied by ideological orientation and vision of the state. However,
there were some common themes. There was general consensus that
politics was overly focused on short-term policy questions with little
emphasis or seeming reward for long-term policy planning. Further -
more, there were strong indications that evidence-based policymaking
was underdeveloped. Both the structures of politics and the people
who occupied them were given unfavourable evaluations. A number of
reports (Regling & Watson, 2010; TASC, 2010) referenced a narrow
elite structure which contributed to groupthink in policymaking. All-
pervasive localism, long accepted as a quirk of the system, was put in
the spotlight. The balance between national policy obligations and
delivering for local constituents was interrogated in public debates,
and there was evidence of a shift in priorities among voters at the 2011
election. In the RTÉ election exit poll, the proportion of voters who
cited ‘delivering for the local area’ as a primary consideration when
making their electoral choice decreased sharply.
Electoral reform was often central to discussions, but opinions were
mixed on how it contributed to the problems in the political system
and how they might be addressed through a change in electoral
procedures. There were few serious proposals to change the electoral
system but there was a clear consciousness that current electoral
practices were not delivering a political class which was capable and
motivated by long-term development of the state. Lack of diversity in
politics was identified as a serious problem. The low numbers of
women in politics and almost complete absence of minorities were
raised in many of the political reform proposals and debates. And
gender quotas, long resisted and derided, were identified as an urgent
and vital reform needed in the system.
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The Dáil as a political institution was subject to sustained critique
for the outdated way it conducted its business and its weak capacity to
deliver informed and rigorous policymaking. The concentration of
power in the hands of a small cabinet overseen by a weak parliament
came to be seen as a fundamental problem. Wide acceptance of the
problem of executive dominance opened the way for a myriad of Dáil
reform proposals, quite a few of which were eventually implemented.
But the debate was wider than just parliament. Ireland has an
especially centralised political system.  
With few formal functions and a weak financial base, local govern -
ment in Ireland is particularly ineffectual. Regional government is all
but non-existent. High levels of fiscal centralisation are also part of the
overall model (Considine & Reidy, 2015; Joumard & Kongsrud, 2003).
The narrow tax base and limited revenue powers meant that the
impact of the economic crisis was rapid and severe at the local level
and there was little capacity for local politicians to influence the
incidence of the retrenchment. During the political reform debate
there was acknowledgement that Ireland is particularly unusual
among EU states in having such a centralised state but, as is so often
the case, local government was tangential in many of the reform
discussions.
The debate was not just limited to political institutions and the
people who occupy them; there was also a debate about the way the
business of politics and administration was conducted in Ireland. The
process of decision-making in the state was especially opaque. The
decision by the Fianna Fáil/Green Party coalition government to
guarantee bank debts was taken late in the night in September 2008
without many of the most senior policy figures present. The formal
decision was finalised through an incorporeal cabinet meeting. The
episode came to exemplify the weaknesses inherent in the decision-
making process. Fundamental questions about who makes policy
decisions, and on what evidence base, were difficult to answer.
Freedom of information legislation in Ireland had been introduced by
the rainbow coalition government (1994–7) but was subsequently
diluted by the Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrats coalition
government that followed it into office. Further, there was little
inclination toward the open government movement which had been
taking hold across many OECD states for some decades.
Taken together, all of these issues point to four key symptoms in the
diagnosis of failure across the Irish political landscape: a lack of
diversity among our political and administrative leaders; weak political
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institutions; centralisation of political, administrative and financial
powers; and a lack of transparency in political decision-making. The
articles in this collection speak to these four symptoms or themes.
Essentially, each of the articles discusses a theme before problem -
atizing it within a particular institution or governmental decision-
making process. To ensure consistency in approach and analysis across
all articles, a number of fundamental questions guide this enquiry,
notably: what political and/or administrative reforms were intro -
duced?; how effective were these in bringing about change and
renewal to the political and administrative system?; was a ‘democratic
revolution’ achieved?; and, as Ireland emerges from recession, has
anything really changed? 
In the following section, we provide an overview of each article and
their key findings. This will then be followed by a concluding section,
which assesses the extent to which a democratic revolution has taken
place in Ireland. 
Overview of this special issue
Arguably, legislative gender quotas were the most prominent political
reform implemented by the Fine Gael/Labour government, and
certainly represented a serious and significant effort on behalf of the
government to incentivise political parties to diversify their candidacy
base. The special issue opens with an article from Mary Brennan and
Fiona Buckley, which sets out the reasons why legislative gender
quotas were introduced for Irish general elections and assesses the
first roll-out of gender quotas at the 2016 general election. Brennan &
Buckley highlight that throughout the adoption and implementation
stages of the legal gender quotas, cultural conservatism of Irish 
party politics and past resistance to affirmative action represented 
key challenges for their effective implementation. The international
experience shows that gender quotas work to increase women’s
political descriptive representation, but to do so, political parties must
engage with them in ‘goodwill’ (Matland, 2006), be ‘well-intentioned’
(Dahlerup, 2007) or place women in ‘winnable seats’ (Murray et al.,
2012). Brennan & Buckley examine if this was the case at the 2016
general election. Using statistics, as well as drawing from interviews
with party strategists, the article assesses the impact of gender quotas
on women’s candidate selection and election. It concludes that parties
did embrace the spirit of the gender quota law and that there were
increases in both the absolute numbers and proportions of women
Democratic revolution? Evaluating the reform landscape after the economic crisis 5
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selected and elected. However, resistance to change remains, leading
Brennan & Buckley to caution against complacency in efforts to
ensure the effectiveness of gender quotas. 
Three articles follow which put the weakness of parliament in
Ireland in the spotlight. Lynch et al. focus on agenda-setting powers
and the position of speaker of parliament (Ceann Comhairle) in their
contribution. The article opens with a benchmarking exercise that
leaves little room for argument about the inadequacies of
parliamentary procedures in the Dáil. They describe a weak parlia -
ment with limited ability to inform legislation or hold government to
account. The article proceeds with an evaluation of the reforms
introduced in both the thirty-first and thirty-second Dáileanna. In
contrast to many contemporary commentators, the authors are
broadly favourable in their evaluation of the changes which have been
implemented. They see them as an essential part of empowering the
Dáil but also point out that the real test of their usefulness will only
come when a government with a parliamentary majority takes up
office. The loss of the Oireachtas inquiries referendum was an early
defeat for the government on Dáil reform but the combination of
several discrete reforms has created the potential for the Dáil to
become a modern and rigorous parliament.
Catherine Lynch continues the focus on Dáil reform in her article,
in which she concentrates on improvements to committee structures
and roles. Again, it is very obvious in the opening sections that
committees in the Dáil could have had a more substantial input into
policy in the past but, as in the preceding article, the overall evaluation
of recent reforms is positive. The use of the d’Hondt system for the
allocation of committee chairs, pre-legislative scrutiny, better
resourcing of committees and changes in the timetabling of committee
business are among the important changes that she highlights.
Kevin Rafter takes up the theme of the economic crisis, more
specifically the way in which the media’s role in the crisis was
examined by the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis
(Banking Inquiry). In contrast to the two preceding articles, Rafter is
more critical in his evaluation of parliament. Following a rigorous
examination of the record of the Banking Inquiry, he concludes that
the ‘parliamentary inquiry did not assist in advancing a serious
understanding of the work undertaken by the Irish media in the pre-
2007 period and that ultimately, for all involved, this engagement was
a missed opportunity’. He questions the broad conclusions delivered
by the committee on the role of the media and his analysis brings to
6 THERESA REIDY AND FIONA BUCKLEY
1 Reidy article_Admin 65-2  09/05/2017  18:36  Page 6
Brought to you by | University College Cork
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/26/17 5:11 PM
mind many of the criticisms which were levelled at TDs and the
Oireachtas in the aftermath of the crisis, such as a tendency towards
grandstanding, lack of attention to evidence, and limited impact and
follow-through on the recommendations of published reports. Indeed,
some of the arguments which flow from Rafter’s analysis were also
part of the debate on the No side in the 2011 Oireachtas inquiries
referendum, and were among the prominent reasons mentioned by No
voters in explaining the reasoning behind their decisions (Marsh et al.,
2012) – that is, TDs could not be trusted to conduct thorough and
impartial investigations.
The articles on Dáil reform directly address the dominance of
government in decision-making and focus on the centralisation of
power in government hands within parliament. The centralisation of
power within the overall political system is the core theme in Aodh
Quinlivan’s article on local government. He provides a critique of the
Putting People First reforms of local government. His criticisms of the
abolition of town and borough councils are tempered by an analysis of
the potential for municipal districts to develop into meaningful units
of local government. However, in his final evaluation he argues that
the additional roles in economic and social development allocated
through the reform process do little to develop local government in
Ireland and that, overall, it continues to be function stripped.
Gary Murphy takes up the transparency theme with his evaluation
of the government’s lobbying regulation. Having been directly
involved with the development of the legislation, he brings an insider’s
perspective to the analysis and delivers a favourable evaluation of the
Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2015. He makes a strong case that its
introduction will enhance transparency and accountability in decision-
making in Ireland.
Turning to administrative reform, Muiris MacCarthaigh is very
complimentary of the reforms and reformers at the Department of
Public Expenditure and Reform (DPER) and, from his overview, it is
indeed clear that there were considerable achievements. In contrast to
Quinlivan’s more critical evaluations of the abolition of town and
borough councils, MacCarthaigh presents this measure as part of the
overall rationalisation and reform process conducted by the Fine
Gael/Labour coalition government. While one of the problems that we
lament in the early discussion of this introduction is centralisation of
power, it is interesting that in some ways MacCarthaigh sees
centralisation as a strength in terms of creating greater responsiveness
and accountability for decisions in DPER. But at the end of this
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article, one is left with the question of why it took a catastrophic crisis
to push toward administrative reorganisation and reform which was
long overdue and had been recommended in many reports and
evaluations. 
Bernadette Connaughton concentrates on the role of special
advisors (or SpAds as they are known) within the political process.
Like both contributions on the Dáil, she clearly demonstrates that
Ireland operates a type of evolving Westminster hybrid and that, just
as Lynch and Lynch et al. argue, there is evidence of a drift towards a
more continental model of governance, a change which is endorsed in
all three contributions which address this topic. SpAds have been
deeply controversial on occasion, scandals about their involvement in
particular policy issues have flared up occasionally1 and there has been
a recurring theme of irritation about their rates of pay in the media.
Specifically in relation to the political reform debates, changes in the
roles and functions of SpAds, as addressed in this article, fall into the
openness and transparency lexicon. Connaughton’s thorough
evaluation leaves us in little doubt that the role and remuneration of
SpAds remain largely unchanged. The government set and rapidly
broke its own pay caps and, while there were some procedural changes
in the specific functions carried out by SpAds, these were not codified
in any substantial way. Opaque appointment procedures and
functional roles remain the norm.
A democratic revolution? Assessing the change process and
the extent of political reform
Collectively, the articles in this special issue cover many of the political
and administrative reforms introduced by the Fine Gael/Labour
coalition government between 2011 and 2016. However, it is not an
exclusive list and this needs to be acknowledged. Space constraints
mean that innovations such as the constitutional convention and
specific public sector reforms are outside the scope of this work.
However, we believe that the special issue surmises and highlights
some of the most significant political reform developments introduced
during the recessionary period and that, through this collective review,
8 THERESA REIDY AND FIONA BUCKLEY
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a number of observations about the political reform process in Ireland
can be made. Moreover, the collection allows us to draw conclusions
as to the extent of change incurred and an assessment of the much-
talked-about democratic revolution. 
Observations of the political reform process
Reform processes rarely take place in a vacuum. It is clear from this
special issue that the financial crisis of 2008 and ensuing recession
were the impetus for Ireland’s political reform discourse and agenda
programme. Many of the issue’s contributors speculate that without
such a crisis, the political opportunity space for reform was limited.
This is an important point to note. Institutional studies advise that the
circumstances in which reform is instigated and implemented can
determine the extent to which there is ‘buy-in’ to proposed reforms
from stakeholders and, indeed, the sustainability and effectiveness of
those reform measures. As Ireland comes out of its deep recession,
calls for pay demands, improved working conditions and increased
public expenditure are once again back on the agenda. Some of the
public sector reforms discussed in this volume focused on cost
efficiencies and rationalisation. As the economy improves, the
sustainability of these reforms will come into question as demands
from various stakeholders increase, risking a return to short-termism
in policy planning, inefficiencies in public expenditure and, ultimately,
the undermining of public sector reforms achieved under the Fine
Gael/Labour coalition government’s reform agenda. 
A recurring theme across many of the contributions is the
importance of a reform champion or policy entrepreneur. Phil Hogan,
TD, Minister for the Environment, Community and Local
Government from 2011 to 2014, and Brendan Howlin, TD, Minister
for Public Expenditure and Reform from 2011 to 2016, are particularly
noted for their innovation and persistence in legislating for political
reform and putting these reforms into practice. Brennan & Buckley
identify the role played by Minister Hogan in bringing through
legislation to incentivise political parties to select women candidates
and address the historical absence of women from Irish politics.
Murphy opines that Minister Howlin’s support for lobbying regulation
was crucial in getting this broad policy change over the line to
challenge the perceived culture of secrecy so admonished by
politicians and the public alike during the financial crisis. In
MacCarthaigh’s assessment of the establishment of DPER, it is clear
that Howlin was again a central figure in advocating for widespread
Democratic revolution? Evaluating the reform landscape after the economic crisis 9
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political reform. Policy entrepreneurs come in many guises. In the case
of Hogan and Howlin, the fact that both were senior members of their
respective political parties, with long-term political experience, as well
as an ability to command respect from party and government
colleagues, ensured dissent was limited and assured political
agreement for reform proposals. The overall evaluation of their terms
in office is mixed.2 However, their legacy as reform champions is
guaranteed as the effects of measures such as gender quotas and
lobbying regulation will – if the early assessments contained in this
issue are anything to go by – have a long-term and positive impact on
Irish politics. 
Policy entrepreneurship is associated with dynamic policy change.
Yet to ensure the effective implementation of change proposals and
their enduring stability, advocacy coalitions are important (Mintrom &
Vergari, 1996). Consultation, or the lack thereof, with various
stakeholders (academic experts, advocacy groups and those impacted
by reform measures) is an integral feature of the political reform
processes highlighted in many of the articles in this special issue. It is
also a determinant of the extent to which widespread ‘buy-in’ to
change processes can be achieved. 
Even when consultation is engaged, policy changes are not always
well received. Resistance to specific political reform measures in
Ireland remains. This is evidenced in the case of gender quotas. As
Brennan & Buckley note in this issue, ‘Institutions are adaptable,
which can result in transformations but can also produce resistance.’
Resistance cannot be ignored, as to do so risks a subversion of the
change potential of reform measures and a reproduction of
institutional norms and legacies which were the bedrock of the ‘broken
politics’ that triggered demands for reform in the first place.
Mechanisms to monitor, review, assess and evaluate political reforms
must be an integral part of policy change processes to ensure their
long-term effectiveness.
A democratic revolution?
At the outset of this introduction, four key failures in the Irish political
landscape were identified: a lack of diversity among our political and
administrative leaders; weak political institutions; centralisation of
10 THERESA REIDY AND FIONA BUCKLEY
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political, administrative and financial powers; and a lack of
transparency in political decision-making. It is clear that the political
reforms introduced have attempted to tackle these issues. And in
many respects they have. As the articles in this special issue will
demonstrate, the implementation of gender quotas at the 2016 general
election saw a 40 per cent increase in the number of women TDs
elected since 2011. Lobbying regulation has facilitated greater
openness and transparency as meetings between lobbyists and
politicians are now publicly recorded. Dáil reforms have seen a
rebalancing of the power relationship between the legislature and
executive. However, what remains to be seen is whether any one of
these reforms, individually or collectively, has the capacity to knock
the system out of its sclerotic approach to governance and
administration. The general election of 2016 saw much deriding of the
Fine Gael/Labour coalition government’s claim of a democratic
revolution as scandals surrounding state board appointments and the
Irish Water debacle brought into question the extent of transparency,
diversity and public expenditure efficiencies achieved. It brings us to
an important point – there are no clear and easy solutions to
governance change. The process of change is multifaceted. Reform
proposals take time to ‘bed down’, as long-term institutional legacies
and cultures combine to attempt to blunt the effectiveness of change.
Moreover, resistance to change is ever-present. However, these
challenges should not be taken as an excuse for inaction. The Fine
Gael/Labour coalition government of 2011–16 should be commended
for initiating the most substantive political reform process seen in
many decades. 
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